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The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
hosts a Fall Academic Conference to bring to-
gether academic and Federal Reserve economists
working in areas of common interest. At the most
recent conference, held on November 30 and
December 1, 1989, papers were presented on the
role of risk in bank behavior, the influence of
information asymmetries on the real economy,
and the role of supply-side factors in business
cycles. This Letter summarizes these papers.
Copies of the papers are available from the
Economic Research Department of the Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
Bank risk
Each of the three banking papers presented
at the Conference focuses on the assessment
of bank risk. A paper by J. Kimball Dietrich
of the University of Southern California, "Bank
Balance Sheet Composition and Stock Market
Return Sensitivity to Macroeconomic Risk Fac-
tors:' examines the effect of macroeconomic
"risk factors" on bank stock returns. Dietrich
studies two separate periods: one prior to deposit
rate deregulation (1973 to 1977) and the other
covering the period in which deposit rates were
deregulated (1978 to 1983). He finds that in both
periods term-structure risk and default risk sig-
nificantly influenced the riskiness of bank stocks.
But he also finds that the volatility of overall
industrial activity affected substantially more of
the subject bank stocks in the later period than
in the earlier period.
Dietrich also estimates the effect of balance
sheet composition on the sensitivity of bank
stock returns to the various macroeconomic risk
factors. He finds that the stock returns of banks
with a higher proportion of demand deposits to
total equity tend to fall less than others' when
there is unexpected inflation. A possible explana-
tion for this result is that since demand deposits
pay no interest, banks with a high proportion of
this type of funding experience a smaller in-
crease in liability costs when nominal interest
rates rise.
In addition, Dietrich demonstrates that larger
holdings of cash and reserves tend to increase
bank sensitivity to unexpected inflation risks.
On the whole, though, differences in asset and
liability composition do not seem to explain
much of the variation in the sensitivity of bank
stocks to macroeconomic risk factors. This sug-
gests that regulators must look beyond overall
balance sheet composition to monitor bank risk
effectively.
A second banking paper, "A Framework for
Assessing Depository Institution Risk;' by Robert
S. Chirinko of the University of Chicago and
Gene D. Guill of Bankers Trust, moves in this
direction. Chirinko and Guill look within a
bank's loan portfolio to see how its make-up
affects the probability of substantial loan losses.
Chirinko and Guill find that loan loss risk
depends very much on the particular distribution
of loans within the bank's portfolio and on the
particular macroeconomic environment. For
example, assuming a relatively expansionary
macroeconomic environment, they find that the
risk-based deposit insurance premium for a bank
with a portfolio heavily weighted toward energy-
related lines of business should be approximately
87 percent higher than for the "average" bank in
the sample.
For all ofthe simulated portfolios they examine,
there seems to be significant positive correlation
between conditions in different industries that
must be taken into account when making risk
assessments. Thus, they find that ignoring cor-
relations among returns on loans in the portfolio
can substantially understate risk exposure. This
finding suggests that the benefits of diversifica-
tion are not always obtained simply by expand-
ing the number of industries represented in a
portfolio.
A third banking paper was by Gary Gorton and
George Pennacchi of th~ University of Pennsyl-
vania, entitled "Banks and Loan Sales: EvidenceFRBSF
of Implicit Contracts." According to a widely
accepted theory of financial intermediation, loan
sales create an incentive problem in that a bank
may not take as much care in evaluating a loan it
intends to sell as it does in evaluating a loan it
intends to hold. Although potential loan buyers
recognize this incentive problem, they do not
have access to the information needed to inde-
pendently determine the riskiness of the loans
offered for sale, and therefore will purchase such
loans only at steep discounts. The puzzle, then,
is why loan sales occur and how a bank can
profit from this activity.
Gorton and Pennacchi attempt to solve this
puzzle by looking for empirical evidence of
"implicit guarantees" in loan sales contracts.
Such a guarantee might be in the form of an
implicit agreement by the selling bank to repur-
chase the loan should it go sour. By providing
recourse, an implicit guarantee eliminates the
incentive problem inherent in loan sales and en-
hances the market value of the loan when soid.
Gorton's and Pennacchi's statistical examination
of about 870 loan sales from a single large bank
yielded no convincing evidence of implicit guar-
antees in loan sales contracts. One explanation
for this result is that such guarantees are present,
but it is simply too difficult to detect them in the
absence of explicit contractual agreements. Al-
ternatively, of course, it may bl= that the implicit
model of bank behavior needs to be modified.
Asymmetric information
Another set of papers examines how information
asymmetries among financial market participants
can affect the financing of investment projects
and ultimately real macroeconomic activity.
"Macroeconomic Models with Equity and Credit
Rationing:' by Bruce Greenwald of Bellcore,
Joseph Stiglitz of Stanford University, and Andrew
Weiss of Boston University, shows that equity
issuance will be limited, and bank credit will
be rationed when the owners of a firm have more
information about the profitability ofthe firm's
projects than do outside investors and bank
lenders.
As a consequence, financial market conditions
can have a major impact on firms' real invest-
ment and output decisions. This connection
between the financial and real sectors suggests
that monetary policy may affect the real econ-
omy more by influencing the supply of credit
than by influencing interest rates. By increasing
the supply of credit available for bank lending,
an increase in the money supply mitigates the
credit short-fall for firms with sound investment
projects.
in "AiL Theory and Ailing Phillips Curve: A
Contract-Based Approach to Aggregate Supply:'
Roger Farmer of the University of California at
Los Angeles suggests that information asymme-
tries provide an explanation for recent instability
in the Phillips curve, which historically has
embodied a negative relationship between wage
inflation and unemployment. However, many
economists have observed that beginning in the
1970s, low aggregate output (and high unemploy-
ment) has been associated at times with high
inflation. Economists who believe that there is
a systematic short-run trade-off between output
and inflation have argued that this apparent
instability can be attributed to changing inflation
expectations and/or changes in the relative prices
of important inputs to production, such as oil.
in Farmer's framework, firms face imperfect
financial markets in which borrowers have more
information than lenders, and borrowers have
limited collateral. Farmer shows that these
market imperfections induce banks to restrict the
supply of loans when real interest rates are high,
making the availability of internally-generated
financing a key determinant ofthe levels of
investment and output during high interest rate
periods. Moreover, Farmer's model posits that the
level of nominal interest rates will influence the
levels of employment and output because firms
must pay their workers in cash, and the nominal
interest rate is the opportunity cost of firms'·
cash holdings.
Farmer finds, then, that the Phillips curve rela-
tionship remains stable over pre- and post-war
periods when these variables-nominal interest
rates and business profits-are included in
econometi"ic tests. •
In "Developing Country Borrowing and Domes-
tic Wealth," Mark Gertler of the University of
Wisconsin and Kenneth Rogoff ofthe University
of California at Berkeley examine the impli-
cations of informational asymmetry between
international lenders and developing country
debtors. Their model assumes that borrowers
can use their domestic wealth and loan proceeds
either for domestic investment or for investmentsfind the distortionary effects of the inflation tax
to be no worse than other taxes. In terms of the
revenues raised, the inflation tax is superior.
In a 1959 study, Irma and Frank Adelman found
that the Keynesian structural model developed by
Klein and Goldberger generated a business cycle
vvith properties similar to the measures con-
structed by Mitchell and Burns. They interpreted
this result to imply that the Klein-Goldberger
model provided a good explanation of U.S.
economic activity.
King and Plosser carry out a similar exercise
using a real business cycle model. They find that
the business cycle properties of their model are
also indistinguishable from the Mitchell-Burns
measures. Given that their model and the Klein-
Goldberger model both pass the Mitchell-Burns
"test;' despite drastically different theoretical
orientations, King and Plosser express concerns
about the power of the Mitchell-Burns measures
to distinguish among models of the U.S.
economy.
However, their framework likely understates the
adverse effects of inflation because it assumes
perfect information and flexible prices. These
assumptions ignore the effects of inflation on
price level uncertainty and multi-period con-
tractual arrangements, both of which can add
significantly to the costs of inflation.
In "Real Business Cycles and the Test of the
Adelmans;' Robert King and Charles Plosser
ofthe University of Rochester assess the ability
of real business cycle models to mimic the
observed characteristics of past u.s. business
cycles. During the 1940s and 1950s economists
Wesley Mitchell and Arthur Burns at the National
Bureau of Economic Research attempted to
measure the empirical regularities observed
over u.s. business cycles in a systematic fashion.
Their measures have provided a benchmark for
testing the ability of models of the macroecon-








Real business cycle theories attribute most
aggregate macroeconomic fluctuations to tech-
nology shocks, rather than to changes in mone-
tary conditions or fiscal spending behavior. Two
papers at the conference examine the ability of
such models to explain particular macroeco-
nomic phenomena.
in riskless assets abroad, with lenders lacking
knowledge of the actual decision made by the
borrower. This creates an incentive problem,
leading to restrictions in the supply of credit.
Consequently, the marginal return on investment
will exceed the marginal cost of capital at the
level of investment actually undertaken in the
borrowing countries.
Thus, differences in cross country marginal
products of capital can persist even when the
international capital market is highly integrated
because of differences in the costs of internal
and external financing of investment. In addition,
the higher a country's net wealth, the higher
should be its level of investment and its ability
to borrow.
Using a jeal business cycle model, Thomas
Cooley of the University of Rochester and Gary
Hansen of the University of California at Los
Angeles offer a rationale for inflationary monetary
policies in their paper, "Some Welfare Costs of
Monetary and Fiscal Pol icy." Although most
policy makers would agree that inflation has
negative welfare and incentive effects, inflation
of varying degrees still is observed across nearly
all countries. Cooley and Hansen suggest that
the costs of inflation notwithstanding, govern-
ments may have an incentive to engage in
inflationary policies. For by reducing the real
purchasing power of money, inflation acts as a tax
directly levied on money holders and collected
by the government.
This still leaves the question whether an inflation
tax is preferable to alternative forms of taxation.
Cooley and Hansen model inflation as an indi-
rect consumption tax levied on goods that can
be purchased only with cash. They then compare
both the efficiency implications and the adverse
welfare effects of using this inflation tax as a
source of revenue with those of direct capital
and income taxes as sources of revenue. They
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